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State v. Fields: The Definition of Driving Under the North
Carolina Safe Roads Act
The 1980s have witnessed a groundswell of public indignation throughout
the country over the problem of the drunken driver.1 The North Carolina Court
of Appeals' decision in State v. Fields 2 reflects this nationwide concern. The
Fields court held that a defendant "drives" within the meaning of the impaired
driving (DWI) provision of North Carolina's Safe Roads Act when he or she sits
behind the wheel of a stationary vehicle.3 The court of appeals based its expan-
sive interpretation of "driving" on a previous North Carolina Supreme Court
decision 4 as well as a clear expression of legislative intent regarding the issue.5
The Fields decision also accords with the general policy considerations that
compelled the North Carolina General Assembly to enact the Safe Roads Act in
1983.6 This Note analyzes Fields and concludes that it is in accord with judicial
precedent and legislative intent. It suggests, however, that in the interest of
fairness the general assembly should amend the statute to provide adequate no-
tice to North Carolina drivers.
At 1:14 a.m. on February 10, 1984, a patrolman from the Blowing Rock
Police Department spotted a stopped car in the right-hand lane of a public
street. He approached the car and found defendant Fields sitting behind the
wheel; the car's owner stood nearby in the bushes. 7 Although the motor was
running, the patrolman never saw the car move. 8 Based on Fields' appearance
and his performance in roadside sobriety tests, he was arrested and taken to the
county jail, where a breathalyzer test was administered. The test showed an
alcohol concentration of 0.14,9 which significantly exceeded the DWI statutory
threshold of 0.10.10
. See, e-g., Watts, The Drinking-Driving Problem: Assessing Some Proposed Solutions, 48
POPULAR GOV'T 20 (Winter 1983).
2. 77 N.C. App. 404, 335 S.E.2d 69 (1985). Defendant has decided not to appeal the decision.
Telephone interview with the Office of Appellate Defender, Adam Stein, defendant's lawyer (Feb.
1986).
3. Fields, 77 N.C. App. at 406, 335 S.E.2d at 70. The provision at issue is N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-138.1 (1983). Although § 20-138.1 is entitled "Impaired driving," the statutory offense is com-
monly referred to as DWI.
4. State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 323 S.E.2d 343 (1984) (general assembly intended no distinc-
tion between "driver" and "operator").
5. During its 1985 session, the general assembly amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01 to pro-
vide that "[tjhe terms 'driver' and 'operator' and their cognates are synonymous." Act of July 1,
1985 ch. 509 § 6(2), 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 579, 580 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
4.01(7) (Supp. 1985)).
6. Safe Roads Act, ch. 435, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 332 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20
(1983)). For a discussion of the policy considerations underlying the act, see infra notes 24-27 and
accompanying text.
7. Fields, 77 N.C. App. at 404-05, 335 S.E.2d at 69.
8. Id. at 405, 335 S.E.2d at 69.
9. Id. The test was administered at 3:05 that morning.
10, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(a)(2) (1983). This subsection makes driving with an alcohol
level of.10 percent or more a per se criminal violation. The requisite showing of alcohol concentra-
tion can be expressed either in terms of grams of alcohol per 100 millileters of blood or per 210 liters
Without contesting the State's evidence at trial, Fields and his companion
testified that only the companion drove that night." They had stopped the car
so that they could "use the bathroom," and defendant had returned first and
started the engine solely to turn on the heater.12 Fields testified that he only
intended to warm up the car; he did not intend to drive, he never put the car in
gear, and the car never moved while he sat behind the wheel. 13 Nonetheless, the
trial court found Fields guilty of driving while intoxicated. 14
The question presented on appeal was whether the State could prosecute
and convict a defendant for DWI without evidence that, while defendant exer-
cised actual physical control of the car, the car had been in motion or that de-
fendant had started the motor to drive the car.15 Fields argued that the DWI
charge should have been dismissed because he never "drove" the car within the
meaning of North Carolina's DWI statute.16 The statute provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Offense.-A person commits the offense of impaired driving if he
drives any vehicle upon any highway, any street, or any public vehicu-
lar area within this State:
(1) While under the influence of an impairing substance; or
(2) After having consumed sufficient alcohol that he has, at any
relevant time after the driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or
more.17
The court held that "one 'drives' within the meaning of G.S. 20-138.1 if he is in
actual physical control of a vehicle which is in motion or has the engine run-
ning," and that defendant's purpose in starting the engine was irrelevant.' 8
In reaching this decision, the court of appeals relied on State v. Coker,19 a
1984 decision in which the North Carolina Supreme Court held that in enacting
the Safe Roads Act, the legislature had intended to make the terms "driver" and
"operator" synonymous. 20 The court also took judicial notice of the fact the
general assembly had specifically amended the Act during its 1985 session to
of breath. Drennan, Impaired Driving: The Safe Roads Act, in NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION
1983 114 (U.N.C. Inst. of Gov't, A. Sawyer ed. 1983).
11. Fields, 77 N.C. App. at 405, 335 S.E.2d at 70.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 404, 335 S.E.2d at 69.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 405, 335 S.E.2d at 70.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(a) (1983) (emphasis added).
18. Fields, 77 N.C. App. at 406, 335 S.E.2d at 70.
19. 312 N.C. 432, 323 S.E.2d 343 (1984), cited in Fields, 77 N.C. App. at 406, 335 S.E.2d at 70.
The defendant in Coker argued that a citation which charged him with operating rather than driving
a vehicle while impaired should be quashed. See infra text accompanying notes 36-37.
20. Coker, 312 N.C. at 436, 323 S.E.2d at 347. This holding also was relied on by the court of
appeals in a case decided shortly before Fields. State v. Dellinger, 73 N.C. App. 685, 687, 327 S.E.2d
609, 611 (1985). In Dellinger, however, the primary issue was whether a horse qualified as a "vehi-
cle" for purposes of DWI. Id. at 687, 327 S.E.2d at 610. The court concluded that it did and upheld
defendant's conviction. Id. The defendant apparently made himself rather conspicuous by repeat-
edly spinning and rearing his mount during the Lincolnton Christmas parade. Id. at 686, 327 S.E.2d
at 610.
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provide that the terms were, indeed, synonymous.2 1 Because the statutory defi-
nition of an "operator" is "a person in actual physical control of a vehicle which
is in motion or which has the motor running,"'22 the court reasoned that evi-
dence of Field's presence behind the wheel of a car while the motor ran was
sufficient to show that he "drove" the car for purposes of section 20-138.1(a). 23
To analyze the court of appeals' opinion in Fields, it is necessary to review
briefly the recent history of DWI law in North Carolina. Enacted against a
background of widespread public indignation directed against drunken driv-
ers,24 the Safe Roads Act of 198325 was a comprehensive revision of state law
regulating drinking and driving.2 6 The Act provided substantially increased
penalties for the newly defined crime of impaired driving. 27 When a trial court
held unconstitutional subsection 20-138. l(a)(2) of the Act, which makes driving
with an alcohol concentration of .10 percent or above a per se criminal viola-
tion, 28 the supreme court, sua sponte, reviewed the decision immediately. 29 In
State v. Rose 30 the supreme court addressed whether subsection 20-138. l(a)(2)
contravened due process because of vagueness and lack of a reasonable relation
21. Fields, 77 N.C. App. at 407, 335 S.E.2d at 70-71. The relevant terms are defined in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01 (Supp. 1983) as follows:
(7) Driver.-The operator of a vehicle, as defined in subsection (25). The terms
"driver" and "operator" and their cognates are synonymous.
(25) Operator.-A person in actual physical control of a vehicle which is in motion or
which has the engine running. The terms "operator" and "driver" and their cognates are
synonymous.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01(25) (1983).
23. Fields, 77 N.C. App. at 407, 335 S.E.2d at 70.
24. See Watts, supra note 1, at 20; see also DRIVING WHILE IMPAIRED, RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON DRUNKEN DRIVERS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT 1
(1983) [hereinafter cited as REPORT] (public hearings revealed a sense of "outrage at the manner in
which our criminal justice system and our society deal with drunken drivers").
The Governor's Task Force on Drunken Drivers noted that 403 of 1,335 fatal accidents in
North Carolina were alcohol related and resulted in 445 deaths. Nationwide, drunken drivers kill
25,000 persons and injure 750,000 more each year. REPORT, supra, at 3.
25. Safe Roads Act, ch. 435, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 332 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20
(1983)).
26. Drennan, supra note 10, at 114. Although driving under the influence of alcohol and driv-
ing under the influence of other drugs previously constituted separate offenses, the Act replaced both
with the single crime of impaired driving. Id. For the modem definition of DWI, see supra text
accompanying note 17.
27. Consistent with the legislative policy of keeping drunk drivers off the road, current penalties
provide forms of automatic license revocation rather than fines or imprisonment. For example, the
1983 Safe Roads Act provides a mandatory license revocation for certain drivers convicted of DWI,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-17(2) (1983), when formerly the trial judge had broad discretion to permit
limited driving privileges, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-179(b)(1) (1975). A second DWI conviction within
three years of a previous conviction results in a mandatory four-year license revocation. N.C. GEN,
STAT. § 20-19(d) (1983). Further, a third offense generally means permanent revocation. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-19(i) (1983). Not all commentators agree that increasing the severity of punish-
ment will reduce the number of accidents involving drunken drivers. See generally H. Ross, DETER-
RING THE DRINKING DRIVER (1982) (an analysis of data from other contries which argues that
increasing the severity of punishment is ineffective and may be counterproductive).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(a)(2) (1983).
29. State v. Rose, 312 N.C. 441, 442-43, 323 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1984).
30. 312 N.C. 441, 323 S.E.2d 339 (1984).
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to any legitimate state purpose.3 1 The Rose court upheld the per se provision
and ruled that it violated neither the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution nor the parallel due process provision in article I, section 19 of the
North Carolina Constitution. 32
Coker,3 3 on which the Fields court explicitly relied,34 was a companion case
to Rose. In Coker the defendant had been arrested and charged in a uniform
citation which alleged "that he did unlawfully and wilfully operate a motor vehi-
cle while subject to an impairing substance. G.S. 20-138.1."'35 The citation was
held to meet the statutory and constitutional requirements of subsection 20-
138.1(c). 36 In reaching its decision, the supreme court acknowledged that prior
statutes and caselaw have distinguished between "driving" and "operating. '37
In a 1972 case, State v. Carter,38 the term "driving" under a former statute had
been interpreted to require motion, even though the statute defined an "opera-
tor" as someone "in the driver's seat while the engine is running. '39 The Coker
court, however, reasoned that because the new Safe Roads Act defines "driver"
in terms of "operator," such a distinction no longer applied.40 Rather, the legis-
lature must have intended that the terms be synonymous.4 1 Shortly after the
Coker decision, the General Assembly affirmed the court's reasoning by amend-
ing the Act to provide that "[tihe terms 'driver' and 'operator' and their cog-
nates are synonymous." 42
Thus, at the time Fields was decided, the supreme court and the general
assembly had made clear that the term "driver" would include any person in
"actual physical control of a vehicle... which has the engine running. ' 43 Cou-
pled with the premise that "driving" is a cognate of "drive," 44 this authority
mandated the court of appeals' conclusion in Fields that proof of someone sitting
behind the wheel of a car while the engine is running satisfies the element of
31. For the statutory language, see supra text accompanying note 17.
32. Rose, 312 N.C. at 443, 323 S.E.2d at 340-41.
33. 312 N.C. 432, 323 S.E.2d 343 (1984).
34. Fields, 77 N.C. App. at 406, 335 S.E.2d at 70.
35. Coker, 312 N.C. at 433, 323 S.E.2d at 345 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 434, 323 S.E.2d at 346. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(c) (1983) provides: "(c) Plead-
ing.-In any prosecution for impaired driving, the pleading is sufficient if it states the time and place
of the alleged offense in the usual form and charges that the defendant drove a vehicle on a highway
or public vehicular area while subject to an impairing substance."
37. Coker, 312 N.C. at 436, 323 S.E.2d at 347.
38. 15 N.C. App. 391, 190 S.E.2d 241 (1972), cited in Coker, 312 N.C. at 436, 232 S.E.2d at
347. In Carter the court upheld the defendant's conviction for driving while intoxicated. Defendant
had been found asleep at the wheel of a car whose engine was running, with an open container of
beer next to him. The car was stopped in front of a stop sign. The court reasoned that enough
circumstantial evidence existed to infer that defendant had been driving, even though the policeman
never actually saw the car in motion. Carter, 15 N.C. App. at 392-94, 190 S.E2d at 242-43.
39. Act of March 5, 1935, ch. 52, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 34, 34, repealed by Act of April 12,
1974, ch. 1330, § 39, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 675, 691.
40. Coker, 312 N.C. at 436, 323 S.E.2d at 347.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 5.
43. Fields, 77 N.C. App. at 406, 335 S.E.2d at 70.
44. "Cognate" is defined as "descended or borrowed from the same earlier form." RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY 287 (unabridged ed. 1973).
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"driving" contained in the DWI statute.45
The Fields holding may appear anomalous to North Carolina drivers be-
cause the ordinary connotation of the word "driving" includes the concept of
motion. The defendant in Fields neither put the car in motion nor apparently
had any intention of doing so.46 Yet, as the supreme court explained in Coker,
"[w]ords having technical meanings must be construed according to such mean-
ings." 47 And the legislature had given the term "driving" at issue in Fields the
sort of technical meaning that properly overrides any ordinary language
connotation.48
One question raised by the Fields decision is whether the court correctly
held that defendant's motive in sitting behind the wheel was "irrelevant."'49 A
conviction for DWI results in substantial criminal penalties.50 Traditionally,
according to the common law, the State must prove a subjective intent and an
overt act to obtain a criminal conviction.51 Thus some requirement of intent
arguably should be taken as implicit in the DWI statute.5 2
Generally, however, motor vehicle violations are regarded as public welfare
offenses that warrant absolute liability.5 3 Intent is irrelevant because the pro-
scribed behavior poses a risk to highway safety regardless of defendant's mental
state.54 Significantly, the North Carolina DWI statute precludes any defense
that the person charged was legally entitled to use the impairing substance. 55 A
similar provision in the Illinois DWI statute has been interpreted as implying a
legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the offense.56 Most impor-
tantly, the defendant in Fields was charged under the alcohol concentration
prong of the DWI statute.57 In upholding section 20-138. l(b)'s per se definition
of the offense, the supreme court in Rose stated that "[a]ll persons are presumed
to know the law and a defendant who drinks and then drives takes the risk that
45. Fields, 77 N.C. App. at 406, 335 S.E.2d at 70.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 12 and 13. Significantly, although "[d]rive" is primarily
defined as "[t]o force (living beings) to move on or away," the secondary signification, "[to carry or
convey in a vehicle," is expressed in terms of "control." 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 671
(1961).
47. Coker, 312 N.C. at 435, 323 S.E.2d at 346. Cf L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVES-
TIGATIONS passim (13th ed. 1973) (Wittgenstein defined meaning primarily in terms of ordinary
usage, but he recognized "language games" in which a conventional usage of a word develops within
a particular sphere of activity, for example, the law.).
48. For the current technical meaning of "driving," see supra note 21.
49. Fields, 77 N.C. App. at 407, 335 S.E.2d at 70.
50. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-16 to -37 (1983). For example, § 20-16.5(e) provides an auto-
matic ten-day license revocation upon even the first conviction.
51. See O'Sullivan, Constitutional Challenges to Montana's Drunk Driving Lasvs, 46 MONT. L.
REV. 329, 331 (1985) (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21).
52. See, eg., Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952) (intent so inherent in concept
of crime that no statutory affirmation is necessary).
53. See O'Sullivan, supra note 51, at 331.
54. O'Sullivan, supra note 51, at 335.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(b) (1983). For example, the fact a person was entitled to use a
prescribed drug would not constitute a defense.
56. People v. Teschner, 76 Ill. App. 3d 124, 127, 394 N.E.2d 893, 895 (1979).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(a)(2) (1983). For the statutory language, see supra text ac-
companying note 17.
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his blood-alcohol content will exceed the legal maximum."5 8 This statement
implies that intent is irrelevant to a DWI conviction.
However, the question still remains whether, assuming the veracity of his
story, it was fair to convict Fields of a crime that entails serious criminal sanc-
tions.5 9 The majority and dissenting opinions of the Utah Supreme Court in
State v. Bugger 60 suggest an alternative approach to this question. The defend-
ant in Bugger was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol after a
policeman found him asleep behind the wheel of a car; the motor was not run-
ning at the time. The majority found the defendant not guilty of DWI because
he had not been in "actual physical control" of the vehicle,6 1 but noted that an
"entirely different" fact situation would have been presented had the motor
been running. 62 Apparently, in such a case sufficient dominion or control over
the automobile would have existed to bring the defendant's conduct within the
wording of the statute.63 The dissent stressed that the relevant state statute,
which originally made it unlawful to "drive" under the influence of alcohol, had
been amended to make it unlawful as well to be in "actual physical control of a
vehicle." 64 The motivation for the amendment was a policy of deterrence: "It is
better to prevent an intoxicated person in charge of an automobile from getting
on the highway than it is to punish him after he gets on it."'65
A policy of deterrence similarly motivated the North Carolina legislature
when it enacted the new DWI law.66 Authorizing police officers to "arrest a
drunk person [before the car is in motion] ... and thus prevent him from wreak-
ing havoc a minute later" 67 serves this deterrence policy. Furthermore, the
state's legitimate interest in protecting the lives of its citizenry68 should out-
weigh the individual's interest in driving69 when defendant's blood alcohol level
is above the statutory limit.70
Yet, to avoid the potential for unfairness and suprise, the legislature should
give notice to the public that an intoxicated person may face a DWI conviction
when he or she sits in the driver's seat of a car whose motor is running. As the
supreme court noted in Rose, statutory language should convey "sufficient deft-
58. Rose, 312 N.C. at 446, 323 S.E.2d at 342 (emphasis added). The court noted that this
rationale had been accepted in other jurisdictions facing challenges to similar provisions. Id.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
60. 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d 442 (1972).
61. Id. at 405-06, 483 P.2d at 443.
62. Id. at 406, 483 P.2d at 443.
63. See id.
64. Id. (Ellet, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. See Watts, supra note 1, at 32.
67. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d at 406, 483 P.2d at 443 (Ellett, J., dissenting).
68. See REPORT, supra note 24, at 3 (50% of drivers killed in traffic accidents were under the
influence of alcohol).
69. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979). In Mackey the Court recognized that the
individual has a substantial interest in a driver's license. Nevertheless, the Court balanced that inter-
est against the government's interest in the safety of its citizens, and upheld the 90-day mandatory
suspension provision of Massachusetts' DWI law. Id. at 10-19.
70. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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nite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common under-
standing and practices." '7 1 Terms must be understandable by "an average
person exercising ordinary common sense." 72 By amending the statutory defini-
tion to provide that "driver" and "operator" are synonymous, 73 the general as-
sembly has partially fulfilled this basic fairness requirement. However, the
public would receive better notice if the DWI provision itself were amended. By
following the example of Utah's impaired driving statute74 and amending sec-
tion 20-138.1(a) to read "drives or is in actualphysical control of any vehicle,"7 5
the North Carolina legislature would overcome any possible objection based on
fairness or lack of notice.76
The court of appeals' decision in Fields was mandated by the supreme
court's holding in Coker and the general assembly's endorsement of that hold-
ing. Nevertheless, it seems unfair to convict someone for impaired driving when
the person was not "driving" in any ordinary sense of the term. The general
assembly could rectify this apparent unfairness by amending the DWI statute to
include not only "driving" but also being "in actual physical control" of the
vehicle within the statement of the offense. Such an amendment would further
the legislative policy of deterring drunken driving.
SUSAN PAYNE
71. Rose, 312 N.C. at 444, 323 S.E.2d at 341 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973);
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1946); In re Burrus, 275 NC. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969)).
72. Id.
73. See supra note 5.
74. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d at 406, 483 P.2d at 443 (Ellett, J., dissenting) ("amendment added a
provision making it unlawful to be in actual physical control ... and did away with the necessity of
driving").
75. For the current statutory language, see supra text accompanying note 17.
76. The Uniform Vehicle Code includes "actual physical control" in its DWI provision, UVC
§ 11-902, and the DWI laws of at least 20 states contain similar or identical language. TRAFFIC
LAWS ANNOTATED § 11-902, at 257 (1979). Whether or not the North Carolina DWI law is
amended, it seems clear that an individual's presence behind the wheel of a car whose engine is not
running would be insufficient for a conviction. The definition of operator in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
4.01(25) (1985) specifies that defendant's vehicle must be "in motion or . . . [have] the engine
running."
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State v. Parker: North Carolina Adopts the
Trustworthiness Doctrine
Criminal suspects rely on a system of constitutional and non-constitutional
doctrines to safeguard their rights as defendants. The United States Constitu-
tion assures criminal defendants the right to due process of law,' assistance of
counsel,2 and the privilege against self-incrimination. 3 Criminal defendants in
North Carolina traditionally have relied on several common-law doctrines-in-
cluding the "voluntariness" doctrine4 and the corpus delicti doctrines-to pro-
vide additional safeguards. Recently, however, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has created substantial ambiguity in the realm of confession law doctrine.6
By abandoning the corpus delicti doctrine in State v. Parker,7 the court may have
opened a Pandora's Box that will force defense attorneys and trial courts to
rethink the way they deal with defendants' confessions and admissions.
The issue in Parker was whether a criminal defendant's extrajudicial con-
fession that he robbed his murder victim had to be corroborated8 by independ-
ent evidence of the essential elements of that crime. The North Carolina
Supreme Court held the defendant's confession "trustworthy" and thus sus-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. The voluntariness doctrine renders confessions inadmissible if they result from an overt
threat of harm or promise of benefit. Although the doctrine arose from case law, its foundation rests
on constititutional due process concerns. See generally Note, State v. Thomas: When is a Confession
Coerced and When is it Voluntary?, 63 N.C.L. REv. 1214 (1985) (discussing the origins of the volun-
tariness doctrine as quasi-constitutional).
5. The traditional corpus delicti doctrine, which derives from common law, operates to exoner-
ate a criminal suspect if the state fails to introduce any evidence apart from the suspect's confession
that he or she actually committed the offense charged. For further discussion of the doctrine and its
origins, see infra notes 43-71 and accompanying text.
6. In State v. Thomas, 310 N.C. 369, 312 S.E.2d 458 (1984), the North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld the conviction of a criminal defendant based in part on his confession. Because the
arresting officer had suggested that defendant confess to "help himself," defendant claimed that his
confession was involuntary and thus inadmissable in court. Id. at 378, 312 S.E.2d at 463. A divided
supreme court rejected his contention. Id. at 379, 312 S.E.2d at 464. According to one student
commentator, "although the Thomas decision is not a pronounced deviation from existing case law
.... there are problems with the court's straightforward approach, including the possibility that use
of coercive confessions will be less restricted in the future." Note, supra note 4, at 1215; see infra
notes 104, 120.
7. 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985). In State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878
(1986), the North Carolina Supreme Court attempted to clarify the Parker decision by stating that
"the pre-Parker rule has not been abandoned but that Parker expanded the type of corroboration
which may be sufficient to establish the trustworthiness of the confession." Id. at 532, 342 S.E.2d at
880 (emphasis added). This Note reasons that, despite this dicta, Parker effectively abandoned the
corpus delicti doctrine traditionally recognized in North Carolina. See infra note 36.
8. "Corroborate" means "[t]o strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional
and confirming facts or evidence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 311 (5th ed. 1979). One commenta-
tor has suggested that the term "corroborate" technically does not apply to the corpus delicti doc-
trine because the doctrine requires that evidence independent of the confession establish the crime
itself. Thus, such evidence would be existential rather than supplementary. See Note, Confession
Corroboration in New York- A Replacement for the Corpus Delicti Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. RaV. 1205,
1211 n.35 (1978). This Note uses the term "corroborate" to encompass existential as well as supple-
mentary evidence.
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tained his conviction for robbery even though the State presented no independ-
ent evidence to support the robbery charge. 9 The significance of Parker is
threefold: First, the decision directly overrules a long line of cases recently reaf-
firmed by the supreme court ° as well as the North Carolina Court of Appeals; 1I
second, the decision marks a departure from the majority approach to confes-
sion corroboration; 12 and last, the decision introduces a new rule of law that
most federal courts and several state courts have adopted-the "trustworthi-
ness" doctrine.13 This Note analyzes Parker in light of the history of the corpus
delicti doctrine, discusses the viability of that doctrine today, and critiques some
of the Parker decision's oversights. It argues that the Parker court failed to
address adequately how the lower courts should ascertain "trustworthiness," but
concludes that North Carolina's new doctrine, if properly understood and con-
sistently applied, may enhance the protections afforded criminal defendants.
In February 1983 sheriff's deputies recovered the bodies of Leslie Levon
Thorbs and Ray Anthony Herring from the Tar River near a bridge in Pitt
County, North Carolina. 14 Herring's wife had last seen Herring alive when he
left his home to visit Thorbs at approximately 10:45 p.m. on February 18, 1983.
Thorbs was last seen alive at about 10:00 p.m. that same night. 5 When Thorbs'
foster child returned home at 12:30 a.m., he noticed Herring's car parked across
the street and the absence of Thorbs' Cadillac. Thorbs' wallet was discovered at
9. Parker, 315 N.C. at 238-39, 337 S.E. 2d at 495-96.
10. See State v. Brown, 308 N.C. 181, 301 S.E.2d 89 (1983), overruled by Parker, 315 N.C. 222,
337 S.E.2d 487 (1985). The Brown court vacated an arson conviction because "[c]ven though the
defendant's confession identifies him as the person who committed the burning, the State must first
establish the corpus delicti, that a crime was in fact committed." Id. at 183, 301 S.E.2d at 90. For
further discussion of Brown in its historical context, see infra note 98.
11. State v. Trexler, 77 N.C. App. 11, 334 S.E.2d 414 (1985), rev'd, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d
878 (1986). The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Trexler reversed a conviction for driving while
impaired because "[t]here was not sufficient evidence to convict the defendant." Id at 12, 334 S.E.2d
at 415. For a discussion of the court of appeals' decision in Trexler, see infra notes 93-102 and
accompanying text. Since the Parker decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court has reversed the
court of appeals' decision. State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986).
12. The vast majority of jurisdictions continue to adhere to the corpus delicti version of confes-
sion corroboration. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 145, at 366 (3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
13. See 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2071, at 511 n.3 (Chadbourn rev. 1978 & Supp, 1985)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; see also infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text (discussing the
trustworthiness doctrine).
14. Parker, 315 N.C. at 224, 337 S.E.2d at 488. Both men died as the result of gunshot wounds
to the head fired from close range. Herring also had been stabbed. Id. Apparently, the girlfriend of
defendant Dwight Parker, Sr., notified the police of the location of the victims' bodies. See Defend-
ant-Appellant's Brief at 5 n.6, Parker. She had helped to dispose of the bodies, although she had not
participated in the commission of the crimes. See id. at 5 n.6; id. at 8 app. (showing trial court
transcript of defendant's extrajudicial confession read into evidence).
15. Parker, 315 N.C. at 224, 337 S.E.2d at 488. According to Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 3
n.1, Parker, "[a]lIthough Mrs. Herring did not know Thorbs, it appears from the record that Mr.
Herring and Thorbs were friends . . . . [Lit was not unusual for Thorbs and Herring to go off
together at night." Defendant Dwight Parker, Sr., did know Thorbs. Id. at 5 n.4. Parker confessed
that he planned the murder and robbery of Thorbs, but that he had not anticipated the arrival of
Thorbs' friend Herring; when Herring showed up unexpectedly, Parker decided to kill him also.
Parker, 315 N.C. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 488-89; see also Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 10-11, Parker
(showing trial court transcript of defendant's extrajudicial confession read into evidence).
[Vol. 641286
CRIMINAL LAW
about noon on February 19, 1983.16
The Pitt County sheriff's department issued a warrant for the arrest of
Dwight Parker, Sr., and on February 26, 1983, investigators apprehended him in
Newark, New Jersey.17 After one of the investigators interrogated Parker for
approximately one hour,18 Parker gave a short written statement admitting that
he had murdered Thorbs and Herring. Eight hours of additional interrogation
produced a second written statement, eight pages in length. 19 This disjointed
account20 of the double murder-robbery of Thorbs and Herring yielded a state-
ment that Parker "got about $25.00 from [Thorbs] and $10.00 from the other
guy."
' 2 1
Although the evidence established that Parker had murdered both victims
and robbed Thorbs, 22 no evidence directly or indirectly proved that Parker had
robbed Herring of any money.2 3 The state offered no evidence that any property
of Herring was missing or taken, 24 and Parker never made any statements to
anyone else regarding the theft.25 A Pitt County jury, however, convicted
Parker on two counts of first degree murder and two counts of armed robbery.26
16. See Parker, 315 N.C. at 227, 337 S.E.2d at 496. The wallet contained several checks and
credit cards, but no currency. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 5, Parker.
17. A neighbor of Parker's girlfriend discovered Thorbs' wallet beneath a window air condi-
tioning unit. Parker, 315 N.C. at 237, 337 S.E. 2d at 496. Parker's girlfriend apparently led investi-
gators to the location of the victims' bodies. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 5 n.6, Parker.
Furthermore, on the afternoon of February 22, 1983, investigators discovered the remains of par-
tially burned cloth with blood stains in a trash can behind the residence of Parker's girlfriend. Id. at
6. The Parker court emphasized that the details of Parker's confession substantially matched this
evidence of the dual slayings and the robbery of Thorbs. Parker, 315 N.C. at 238-39, 337 S.E.2d at
496.
18. Parker fled the state soon after the murders, ostensibly to attend an aunt's funeral in New
Jersey. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 6 n.9, Parker. A team of Pitt County sheriff's investigators
pursued Parker to New Jersey and apprehended him with the assistance of New Jersey police of-
ficers. They interrogated him in the Newark, New Jersey, Courts Building. See id. at 7-8.
19. Id. at 8.
20. Parker's confession, which a State witness read into evidence, contains some detail but the
wording is rather incoherent. "Disjointed" was the term used by Parker's counsel on appeal. Id. at
8 n.16.
21. Id. at 9 app. (showing trial court transcript of defendant's extrajudicial confession read into
evidence). Parker did not elaborate on this reference to the robbery of Herring. He did confess that
he stole "$35.00 and the preacher's ring" and then "split the money" with his girlfriend. Id. at 12
app. No other evidence or testimony demonstrated that Parker actually took $10.00 from Herring.
Parker, 315 N.C. at 237, 337 S.E.2d at 496.
22. Parker, 315 N.C. at 236-38, 337 S.E.2d at 495-96; see also supra notes 14-20 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the facts and referring to pertinent portions in the trial transcript containing
defendant's confession).
23. Parker, 315 N.C. at 238-39, 337 S.E.2d at 496.
24. When Ray Herring left his residence, he did not tell his wife where he was going, and no
evidence indicated whether he took any money with him. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 16, Parker.
25. See supra note 21. Counsel for defendant stressed that
The state offered no evidence that Herring had any property that was missing after the
crime. The State offered no evidence that the defendant made statements to anyone that he
was planning to rob Herring. The State offered no evidence that the defendant told anyone
other than the arresting officers that he took any property from Herring.
Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 17, Parker.
26. The trial court sentenced Parker to two life terms for each murder conviction and to 14
years for each armed robbery conviction, ruling that he serve all sentences consecutively. Parker,
315 N.C. at 224, 337 S.E.2d at 488. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1981), the State may charge a
criminal defendant with a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing," or with a "murder...
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Parker appealed his sentence, and the North Carolina Supreme Court granted
his motion to bypass the court of appeals on the armed robbery conviction. 27
Parker contended that, absent a corpus delicti aliunde28 his confession, he could
not be convicted for the robbery of Herring.29
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld Parker's conviction on all
counts.30 After dispensing summarily with Parker's fourth amendment argu-
ment,31 the court addressed the merits of Parker's corpus delicti argument and
held that "there was sufficient corroborative evidence to bolster the truthfulness
of the defendant's confession and to sustain a conviction as to the Herring armed
robbery even though there was no independent evidence tending to prove the
corpus delicti of that crime."'32 The court expressly overruled language in State
v. Brown,33 State v. Franklin,34 and other prior cases decided under the corpus
delicti doctrine.35 In place of that doctrine, the court adopted "a rule in non-
capital cases that when the State relies upon the defendant's confession to obtain
a conviction," a conviction will stand so long as "the accused's confession is
supported by substantial independent evidence tending to establish its
trustworthiness." 3
6
committed in the perpetration of any... robbery,... or other felony committed or attempted with a
deadly weapon," and in either case a conviction would constitute first degree murder. In Parker the
State successfully prosecuted Parker on two counts of first degree murder; it also obtained two sepa-
rate convictions on charges of armed robbery, Parker, 315 N.C. at 224, 337 S.E.2d at 488, each of
which carries a minimum sentence of 14 years. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (1981). For further
discussion of the State's strategy in seeking these particular convictions rather than others, see infra
notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
27. Parker, 315 N.C. at 224, 337 S.E.2d at 488.
28. "Aliunde" literally means "[tfrom another source; from elsewhere, from outside." BLACK'S
LAW DICrIoNARY 68 (5th ed. 1979). This Note uses the word to mean "independent of" or "apart
from."
29. Parker, 315 N.C. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 489.
30. Id. at 238, 337 S.E.2d at 496.
31. Parker contended that he was subjected to an unlawful search and seizure, but the court
rejected this argument. Id. at 226, 337 S.E.2d at 489-90. In addition, Parker requested that the
North Carolina Supreme Court reconsider its position on the issue of death-qualified juries, which
the court refused to do. Id. at 239, 337 S.E.2d at 497.
32. Id. at 238-39, 337 S.E.2d at 496-97.
33. 308 N.C. 181, 301 S.E.2d 89 (1983).
34. 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983).
35. Parker, 315 N.C. at 239, 337 S.E.2d at 497. By implication, the Parker decision also over-
ruled the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Trexler, 77 N.C. App. 11, 334 S.E.2d
414 (1985), rev'd, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986).
36. Parker, 315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495. In State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d
878 (1986), the North Carolina Supreme Court attempted to clarify and qualify its Parker decision.
Speaking for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Branch stated that
the pre-Parker rule has not been abandoned but that Parker expanded the type of corrobo-
ration which may be sufficient to establish the trustworthiness of the confession. The pre-
Parker rule is still fully applicable in cases in which there is some evidence aliunde the
confession which, when considered with the confession, will tend to support a finding that
the crime charged occurred. The rule does not require that the evidence aliunde the confes-
sion prove any element of the crime.
Id. at 532, 342 S.E.2d at 880. Rather than clarify the status of confession corroboration doctrine in
North Carolina, the supreme court's Trexler decision further confuses the issues. The traditional
corpus delicti doctrine requires that the state obtain a conviction using independent evidence of es-
sential elements of the crime itself. See infra notes 43-47, 66-67 and accompanying text. In con-
trast, the trustworthiness doctrine requires that the state obtain a conviction using independent
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The Parker court made several policy arguments in support of its ruling. It
reasoned that the corpus delicti doctrine had created confusion and inconsisten-
cies among the courts;37 the doctrine had proved burdensome for the State;38
and finally, modem constitutional decisions such as Miranda v. Arizona,39 as
well as the state's voluntariness doctrine,4° adequately safeguard the rights of
criminal defendants. Moreover, the Parker court stressed that the trustworthi-
ness doctrine represents a better approach to confession corroboration con-
cerns.4 1 The court reasoned that Parker clearly had murdered both victims and
robbed at least one of them, and details in his confession closely paralleled in-
dependent evidence of these crimes.42 Absent any indication of unreliability, the
court found no reason to disbelieve defendant's admission of guilt.
To analyze Parker thoroughly, it is first necessary to consider the develop-
ment of the corpus delicti doctrine. Corpus delicti means "[tihe body of the
crime .... In a derivative sense, the substance or foundation of a crime; the
substantial fact that a crime has been committed." 43 Traditionally, the corpus
delicti of a crime consists of three components: First, proof of a specific injury,
harm, or loss such as the dead body in a homicide case or the burned building in
an arson case;44 second, proof that someone's criminal conduct caused the in-
jury, loss, or harm;45 and last, proof of the accused's identity or agency as the
criminal.4 6 In North Carolina, prior to Parker, the State had to establish the
first two components using evidence aliunde defendant's confession, although a
confession sufficed to prove identity or criminal agency.47
evidence that corroborates the defendant's confession. See infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
Chief Justice Branch seemingly confused the two doctrines.
In Parker Justice Billings clearly rejected North Carolina's traditional corpus delicti doctrine.
See Parker, 315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495 ("[I]t is no longer necessary that there be independ-
ent proof tending to establish the corpus delicti of the crime charged .... ). Chief Justice Branch
merely stated a truism when he noted that the state must introduce independent evidence of the
corpus delicti when the evidence exists. See Trexler, 316 N.C. at 528, 342 S.E.2d at 878 (1986).
Trexler essentially preserves the Parker ruling and all its ramifications. Thus, although the state may
rely on the "rule enunciated in Parker" when "independent proof [of the corpus delicti] is lacking,"
id. at 532, 342 S.E.2d at 881, Trexler apparently still requires that the courts pay nominal homage to
the old corpus delicti doctrine. The same concerns that Justice Billings expressed in Parker, see infra
notes 86-92 and accompanying text, have returned to haunt North Carolina courts.
37. See Parker, 315 N.C. at 233, 337 S.E.2d at 493.
38. See id. at 234, 337 S.E.2d at 494.
39. 384 U.S. 436, 436 (1966) (establishing procedural safeguards for any individual who is
"taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way
and is subjected to questioning").
40. In North Carolina a confession must be "voluntary" to be admissible as evidence of guilt. 2
H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 183 (2d rev. ed. 1982). For further
discussion of the voluntariness doctrine and its relation to the corpus delicti doctrine, see infra notes
104, 118-20 and accompanying text.
41. Parker, 315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495.
42. Id. at 236-37, 337 S.E.2d at 495-96; see supra notes 14-22 (discussing the facts and referring
to pertinent portions of the trial transcript).
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 310 (5th ed. 1979).
44. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2072, at 524-25. Wigmore remarks that "the term corpus
delicti in its orthodox sense" would only apply to this first component. Id. at 524.
45. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2072, at 525-26.
46. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2072, at 526.
47. Parker, 315 N.C. at 231, 337 S.E.2d at 492-93; see also State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 690,
304 S.E.2d 579, 584-85 (1983) (citing WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2072, at 524-25); State v. Green,
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The corpus delicti doctrine originated in England to guard against wrongful
convictions of innocent defendants. 4s In the United States all but a few jurisdic-
tions49 adopted the doctrine, requiring proof aliunde defendant's confession that
a crime had occurred. Until the seminal case of State v. Cope,50 North Carolina
apparently did not recognize the need for corpus delicti proof when a defendant
confessed to a crime.51 Since Cope, however, North Carolina courts have recog-
nized and applied the doctrine in numerous cases under varying circum-
stances.52 Today, most jurisdictions still adhere to the corpus delicti doctrine5 3
while the federal courts54 and several state courts55 have adopted a new ap-
295 N.C. 244, 248, 244 S.E.2d 369, 371-72 (1978) (stating that independent evidence of injury and
causation is required, but a confession may establish criminal identity). Most corpus delictijurisdic-
tions require that the State prove only these first two components. See MCCORMICK, supra note 12,
at 366-67.
48. See WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2070, at 508-10.
49. Wigmore refers to Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Wisconsin as three jurisdictions that
initially refused to embrace the corpus delicti doctrine. See WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2071, at 511
n. 1. Only Massachusetts still clings to the rule that a criminal conviction may be based solely on a
defendant's confession, without extrinsic corroboration. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321
Mass. 290, 73 N.E.2d 468 (1947) (upholding conviction for indecent assault based solely on
confession).
50. 240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954) (interpreting prior cases and readopting the corpus
delicti doctrine).
51. In the early case of State v. Long, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 455, 456 (1797), North Carolina
seemed to adopt the general American rule requiring corroboration: "[A] naked confession, unat-
tended with circumstances, is not sufficient." Id. at 246. However, in State v. Cowan, 29 N.C. (I
Ired.) 239 (1847), Chief Justice Ruffin stated that a "fully proved" and voluntary extrajudicial con-
fession "which goes to the whole case is plenary evidence to the jury." Id. at 246. In Cope the North
Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed the earlier Long holding and again joined the majority of juris-
dictions requiring corroboration. Cope, 240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954). See generally Note,
Criminal Law--Confessions---Admissibility of Corroborative Evidence, 42 N.C.L. REV. 219 (1963)
(commenting on the development of the corroboration requirement).
52. See, eg., Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (upholding first degree murder conviction
of defendant charged with felony murder), 'overruled by Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487
(1985); Brown, 308 N.C. 181, 301 S.E.2d 89 (vacating an arson conviction based on defendant's
uncorroborated confession), overruled by Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985); State v.
Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 296 S.E.2d 433 (1982) (upholding conviction for attempted receipt of stolen
property); State v. Whittemore, 255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E.2d 396 (1961) (upholding conviction for
crime against nature); State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961) (upholding conviction for
murder); State v. Bass, 253 N.C. 318, 116 S.E.2d 772 (1960) (reversing conviction for violating
North Carolina's "Peeping Tom" statute); State v. Trexler, 77 N.C. App. 11, 334 S.E.2d 414 (1985)
(reversing conviction for driving while intoxicated), rev'd, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986).
53. See MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 366. A few jurisdictions have codified the corpus delicti
doctrine. See id. at 365 n.3.
54. In the seminal case of Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954), the United States
Supreme Court resolved conclusively that "the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, in-
dependent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. It is necessary, therefore, to require the
government to introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trust-
worthiness of the statement." Id. at 93. In a companion case, Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147
(1954), the Supreme Court ruled that all elements of a crime must be proved by the State, but "one
available mode of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and
thereby prove the offense 'through' the statements of the accused." Id. at 156. Almost all lower
federal courts now follow this version of the confession corroboration doctrine. See, e.g., United
States v. Waller, 326 F.2d 314 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1963); see also WIGMoRE, supra
note 13, § 2071, at 511 n.3 (listing federal decisions recognizing the trustworthiness doctrine), See
generally McCo~mitcK, supra note 12, at 368-70 (discussing the development of the "Trustworthi-
ness of Confession" doctrine).
55. See WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2071, at 511 n.3. With the North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in Parker, North Carolina became the latest addition to this growing minority of
jurisdictions.
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proach to confession corroboration-the "trustworthiness" doctrine, which fo-
cuses on the reliability of a defendant's confession rather than independent
evidence of the corpus delicti.5 6
Over time the corpus delicti doctrine assumed various manifestations. Orig-
inally the doctrine evolved as a "first cousin" 57 of the common-law voluntari-
ness doctrine,5 8 which renders inadmissible confessions obtained by threat of
harm or promise of benefit. Whereas the voluntariness doctrine has "constitu-
tional underpinnings, the corroboration requirement has never attained that
stature," nor has it been "implemented as an 'exclusionary rule.' -59 Rather, the
doctrine's significance in criminal cases60 pertains to the sufficiency of corrobo-
rative evidence: has the State marshalled enough evidence aliunde defendant's
confession to establish the body of the crime and hence sustain a conviction? 61
Prior to the Parker decision, the doctrine applied to all extrajudicia 62 confes-
sions and apparently all admissions in North Carolina. 63 The courts, however,
recognized special rules of application in felony murder cases" and homicide
56. The trustworthiness doctrine gained impetus from federal and state court decisions that
abandoned the old corpus delicti doctrine. See supra notes 54-55. For further discussion of the
trustworthiness doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 107-12.
57. See Margolis, Corpus Delicti: State of the Disunion, 2 SuFmOLK U.L. REv. 44, 46 (1968).
58. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 1220-27 (discussing the development of the voluntari-
ness doctrine as well as its current viability in North Carolina).
59. Note, supra note 8, at 1210.
60. As a general rule, the corpus delicti doctrine does not apply to admissions of a party in a
civil case. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2075, at 534. In one unusual case, Bell v. Page, 271 N.C. 396,
156 S.E.2d 711 (1967), defendant invoked the corpus delicti doctrine to defeat plaintiff's claim of
negligence per se. Plaintiff relied on defendant's extrajudicial admission to prove that defendant
failed to comply with a municipal ordinance. Id. at 399, 156 S.E.2d at 712. Upholding a verdict
against defendant, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that enough evidence supported the
admission to satisfy the corpus delicti doctrine. Id.
61. See Note, supra note 8, at 1210-11 (remarking that the corpus delicti doctrine constitutes
"an added requirement of evidentiary sufficiency needed to get to the jury").
62. The corpus delicti doctrine applies only to extrajudicial confessions. When the accused
makes a confession in court or to a magistrate, the need for corroborative evidence subsides because
the doctrine evolved to guard against wrongfully obtained or mistakenly uttered confessions. See
infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text; Developments in the Law- Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REv.
935, 1079-80 (1966) (discussing infrajudicial and extrajudicial statements and the applicability of the
doctrine) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
63. See 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 40, § 182, at 62. A "confession" is defined as a "voluntary
,statement made by a person charged with the commission of a crime or misdemeanor, communi-
cated to another person, wherein he acknowledges himself to be guilty of the offense charged."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 269 (5th ed. 1979). In comparison, "admissions" should be regarded as
"statements by a party ... of the existence of a fact which is relevant to the cause of his adversary."
Id. at 44. Admissions may result from either inculpatory statements or exculpatory statements. See
Developments, supra note 62, at 1078. The potential for wrongly induced or falsely uttered admis-
sions equals that of confessions, and so traditionally all statements by the defendant fell within the
scope of the corpus delicti doctrine. See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 92 (1954); Develop-
ments, supra note 62, at 1078-80. The North Carolina Supreme Court recently concluded that "the
corpus delicti rule applies with equal force to confessions and admissions," and categorized confes-
sions as "a type of ... admission." State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 531, 342 S.E.2d 878, 879-80
(1986).
64. See, eg., Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579, in which the North Carolina Supreme
Court departed from the traditional corpus delicti doctrine and set a new precedent for felony mur-
der cases. Defendant in Franklin confessed that he had forced a young girl to perform fellatio on.
him and then murdered her. Although the State introduced no evidence of the underlying first
degree sex offense, the court upheld defendant's conviction for felony murder. Id. at 693-94, 304
1986]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cases generally. 65
To establish the corpus delicti of a crime, 66 the State traditionally must
prove all essential elements of the crime aliunde defendant's confession. 67 The
corpus delicti doctrine, however, allows for some flexibility. As a general rule,
the courts do not require independent evidence of every fact necessary to sustain
a conviction, 68 especially if that fact relates to questions of degree or circum-
stance. 69 Moreover, either direct or circumstantial evidence may suffice to sus-
tain a conviction, so long as the evidence tends to substantiate the corpus
delicti.70 The order of evidence presented at trial may vary without prejudicing
the State's case. 7 1
S.E.2d at 586; seesupra note 26 for the relevant portions of North Carolina's murder statute. Frank-
lin formulated a new twist to the old corpus delicti doctrine and set the stage for Parker:
Where there is proof of facts and circumstances which add credibility to the confession and
generate a belief in its trustworthiness, and where there is independent proof of death, in-
jury, or damage, as the case may require, by criminal means, these concerns vanish and the
rule has served its purpose. Elements of the offense may then be proved through the state-
ments of the accused.
Franklin, 308 N.C. at 693, 304 S.E.2d at 586 (emphasis added), Thus, as recognized by the Parker
court in 1985, "the Franklin opinion makes clear that the corpus delicti of felony murder 'is estab-
lished by evidence of the death of a human being by criminal means.'" Parker, 315 N.C. at 228, 337
S.E.2d at 490 (quoting Franklin, 308 N.C. at 692, 304 S.E.2d at 585-86); accord People v. Daly, 47
N.Y.2d 916, 393 N.E.2d 479, 419 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1979) (allowing defendant's confession to prove the
underlying felony in a felony murder case). But cf People v. Allen, 390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21
(1973) (ruling that corroborative evidence must tend to prove the felony).
65. See, eg., State v. Jensen, 28 N.C. App. 436, 221 S.E.2d 717 (1976) (ruling that the corpus
delicti in criminal homicide involves the fact of death and existence of criminal agency). Professor
McCormick cautions that "[tihe corroboration requirement must be distinguished from the common
law rule that a murder conviction required direct proof of death of the victim or of the act of the
defendant alleged to have caused the death of the victim." MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 365-66
n.3. See generally Perkins, The Corpus Delicti of Murder, 48 VA. L. REV. 173 (1962) (discussing the
elements that comprise the corpus delicti of murder).
66. For a discussion of the doctrine's definition and components, see supra text accompanying
notes 43-47.
67. See Developments, supra note 62, at 1073 (noting that "any element essential to the crimi-
nality of the act alleged seems to be normally included in the corpus delicti"). The burden of proof
traditionally rests on the state. To prove its case, the state traditionally must substantiate the corpus
delicti. See State v. Trexler, 77 N.C. App. 11, 16-17, 334 S.E.2d 414, 417-18 (Becton, J., concurring)
(arguing that the corpus delicti doctrine constitutes part of the state's burden of proof), rev'd, 316
N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986).
68. See Developments, supra note 62, at 1074-75.
69. See Developments, supra note 62, at 1074-75.
70. Regarding the quantum and character of evidence required to establish the corpus delictI,
McCormick has remarked that
there is widespread but apparently not universal agreement that the corroborating evidence
need not establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. Wide variation exists in
the statement of the standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence. If this is met,
however, it is quite clear that this evidence and the defendant's confession can be consid-
ered together in determining whether the prosecution has proved those matters constitut-
ing the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. The corroborating evidence need not
necessarily be direct evidence; circumstantial proof will do. On the other hand, another
uncorroborated statement of the defendant cannot be used to meet the requirement; a con-
viction will not, in other words, be upheld upon proof of two or more otherwise uncorrobo-
rated confessions.
MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 368. North Carolina courts apparently have recognized a low
threshold for determining the sufficiency of corroborative evidence. SeeParker, 315 N.C. at 236, 337
S.E.2d at 494-95 (describing North Carolina as being in accord with most other corpus delicitijuris-
dictions, before ruling that the doctrine no longer applies in this jurisdiction).
71. Trial judges typically do not impose a strict requirement that independent evidence precede
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At least three grounds traditionally have been used to justify the common-
law doctrine of corpus delicti. First, an unreliable confession could result in the
conviction of an innocent person.72 Some courts have viewed confessions as
inherently unreliable,73 while other courts have stressed the potential for
wrongly obtained and hence falsely uttered confessions. 74 In theory, independ-
ent evidence of the body of the crime eliminates this concern. Second, when the
courts require corroborative evidence to substantiate a charge, they ensure that a
crime in fact has occurred and they avoid ambiguities that otherwise might
arise.75 Third, the corpus delicti doctrine shifts the burden of producing evi-
dence onto the State which generally bears the burden of proof in criminal
cases.
76
the introduction of defendant's confession or admission. See Developments, supra note 62, at 1082
(noting that "no case seems to have held that an erroneous order of proof requires a new trial"). In
addition, although the trial court monitors the introduction of evidence, some jurisdictions would
allow the jury to determine the sufficency of corpus delicti proof. See id. at 1081-82.
72. See generally Developments, supra note 62, at 1082-83 (evaluating the rationale of the doc-
trine); Note, supra note 8, at 1207-09 (evaluating the rationale of the doctrine). This concern mayjustify recognition of the corpus delicti doctrine whether the defendant faces a possible conviction for
a capital or noncapital offense, because the risk of a wrongful conviction in a noncapital case equals
or exceeds the risk involved in a capital case. See Developments, supra note 62, at 1081.
73. In the first North Carolina case to invoke the corpus delicti doctrine, the court admonished
that "[a] confession, from the very nature of the thing, is a very doubtful species of evidence, and to
be received with great caution." State v. Long, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 455, 456 (1797) (decision vacating
defendant's conviction for horse stealing). In the recent case of State v. Trexler, 77 N.C. App. 11,
334 S.E.2d 414 (1985), rev'd, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986), decided immediately prior to
Parker, Judge Becton warned that in the absence of a confession corroboration requirement, "de-
fendants would be pressured to take the stand in many instances to explain their insoluably ambigu-
ous statements or testify that their allegedly criminal acts resulted from negligence or accident. This
the law does not require." Id. at 17, 334 S.E.2d at 417 (Becton, J., concurring) (decision reversing
defendant's conviction for driving while intoxicated). But compare Long and Trexler with the
court's decision in State v. Cowan, 29 N.C. (1 Ired.) 239, 246 (1847), which declared that "a confes-
sion which goes to the whole case is plenary evidence to the jury." The precedent established in
Cowan was later overruled. See supra notes 50-51.
74. See Developments, supra note 62, at 1082-83. One egregious case involving a wrongly in-
duced confession arose in North Carolina. State v. Bass, 253 N.C. 318, 116 S.E.2d 772 (1960).
Defendant in Bass, a black man, had "confessed" that he had peered into the window of a Mrs.
Bessie Hardy without her consent, in violation of North Carolina's "Peeping Tom" statute. Defend-
ant later contended that the sheriff's deputies had threatened and beaten him and that therefore his
confession was involuntary. Rather than delve into the voluntariness of his confession, the Bass
court reversed defendant's conviction because the State had failed to satisfy the corpus delicti doc-
trine. See id. at 332-24, 116 S.E.2d at 775-76. For other authority on North Carolina's voluntari-
ness doctrine, see Note, supra note 4.
75. As one student commentator noted, the corpus delicti doctrine "seeks to prevent convic-
tions based on a confession to a nonexistent crime." Note, supra note 8, at 1207. It shocked the
public's conscience when "victims" sometimes returned alive after their supposed murderers had
been convicted. See id. at 1205, 1207. To ensure that this phenomenon would not happen, and also
to guard against convictions based on speculation or conjecture, the doctrine requires some corrobo-
rative evidence. See State v. Brown, 308 N.C. 181, 184, 301 S.E.2d 89, 90-91 (1983) (reversing arson
conviction), overruled by Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487; see also State v. Bass, 253 N.C. 318,
323, 116 S.E.2d 772, 776 (1960) (reversing conviction because "[t]he evidence offered is circumstan-
tial, conjectural, and speculative").
76. In Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954), the United States Supreme Court
recognized that a confession corroboration doctrine rests partly on "the realization that sound law
enforcement requires police investigations which extend beyond the words of the accused." In a
North Carolina Court of Appeals opinion decided prior to Parker, State v. Trexler, 77 N.C. App. 11,
334 S.E.2d 414 (1985), rev'd, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986), Judge Becton eloquently de-
fended the corpus deliciti doctrine on these grounds:
[I]mplicit in our criminal justice system is the social contract notion that in exchange for
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In State v Parker77 the North Carolina Supreme Court encountered a situa-
tion that traditionally would require independent evidence of the corpus delicti.
There was sufficient evidence to establish that Parker had murdered both Her-
ring and Thorbs and that Parker had robbed Thorbs.78 However, only Parker's
ambiguous statement that he "got... $10.00 from the other guy" indicated that
he had robbed Herring.79 Rather than accuse Parker of felony murder, which
clearly would have resulted in a first degree murder conviction, 80 the State pros-
ecuted Parker for armed robbery81 in addition to the first degree murder of Her-
ring.82 The supreme court upheld Parker's separate armed robbery conviction"
and abandoned the corpus delicti doctrine altogether.84 In its place, the court
adopted the "trustworthiness" doctrine.85
our inability to discover the "absolute" truth, we assure criminal defendants that we will
provide them as fair a trial as humanly possible. And so the balance won't be further
skewed by whatever inherent advantage the State may have, we give criminal defendants
certain procedural rights, we place the burden of proof on the State, and we give the de-
fendant an absolute right not to testify or present a defense.
Id. at 16-17, 334 S.E.2d at 447 (Becton, J., concurring).
77. 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985).
78. See id. at 237, 337 S.E.2d at 495-96; supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
80. See Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579. In Franklin the North Carolina Supreme
Court carved out an "exception" to the corpus delicti doctrine: the corpus delicti of felony murder
"is established by evidence of the death of a human being by criminal means independent of [a]
confession," and a confession suffices to prove the underlying felony. Id. at 692, 304 S.E.2d at 585-
86. The Parker court recognized correctly that the holding in Franklin did not abolish the corpus
delicti doctrine. See Parker, 315 N.C. at 228, 337 S.E.2d at 490-91. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
87 (1981), the defendant may face charges of actual or attempted robbery. Armed robbery is defined
as "the nonconsensual taking of the personal property of another in his presence or from his person
by endangering or threatening his life with a firearm or other deadly weapon, with the taker knowing
that he is not entitled to the property and intending to permanently deprive the owner thereof."
State v. Bates, 309 N.C. 528, 534, 308 S.E.2d 258, 262 (1983). Whether an attempted robbery has
occurred is a question of fact. The trial court must determine whether the acts of the defendant
advanced beyond the stage of mere preparation and whether the defendant exhibited the requisite
intent. See State v. Powell, 6 N.C. App. 8, 12, 169 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1969). In Parker the defendant
concededly used a gun in the perpetration of the double murder-robbery, although the gun never was
recovered. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 9 n.18, Parker. It is an open question whether the
State may have prevailed on an attempt theory.
81. For a glimpse at relevant portions of North Carolina's murder statute, see supra note 26.
For additional information on the Franklin case, see supra note 64.
82. Parker, 315 N.C. at 222, 337 S.E.2d at 488. It appears that the State made a conscious
choice to prosecute Parker for armed robbery as a separate offense. In its brief, the State explained
that
Unlike Franklin .... the State here did not adopt a felony murder theory and the trial
court charged the jury only on the theory of premeditation and deliberation. The evidence,
however, plainly supports such a theory as to the murder of Ray Herring. However, a
felony murder theory precludes the State from prosecuting a defendant on the separate
armed robbery of Ray Herring.
Brief for the State at 7-8, Parker. Thus, Parker's separate conviction for armed robbery carried an
additional 14-year sentence, to be served consecutively. See Parker, 315 N.C. at 222, 337 S.E.2d at
488.
83. See Parker, 315 N.C. at 238-39, 337 S.E.2d at 496-97.
84. Id. The court added that "[b]y this ruling, we expressly overrule language in State v.
Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983), State v. Brown, 308 N.C. 181, 301 S.E.2d 89 (1983)
and other prior cases on the corpus delicti issue cited in these opinions which is inconsistent with our
holding in the instant case." Parker, 315 N.C. at 239, 337 S.E.2d at 496-97.
85. Parker, 315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495; see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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Writing for a unanimous court, 86 Justice Billings gave at least three reasons
for abandoning the corpus delicti doctrine. First, the doctrine defies ready defini-
tion, and "[ilt is therefore axiomatic that the results obtained through applica-
tion of a rule requiring independent proof of the corpus delicti will not be
consistent or comparable."87 Various factors add to the confusion: (1) many
courts have failed to distinguish between the requirements of the doctrine88 and
the elements of a crime;8 9 (2) it is "nearly impossible" to apply the doctrine to
crimes that traditionally have no tangible corpus, such as conspiracy and the
"attempt" crimes;90 and (3) modem statutes often define crimes that have no
obvious corpus per se.9 1 For these reasons, Justice Billings argued that the
corpus delicti doctrine places an unwarranted burden on the state.92
State v. Trexler,93 a case that the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided
immediately prior to Parker,94 seemingly supports the view that the doctrine
spawns inordinate controversy and confusion. In Trexler defendant was tried
and convicted for driving while intoxicated: defendant's car had wrecked, and
soon afterwards he was discovered nearby in an intoxicated state.95 A divided
North Carolina Court of Appeals overturned defendant's conviction because the
State introduced no evidence, apart from defendant's extrajudicial admission,96
86. Justice Billings wrote the Parker opinion. Suprisingly, not a single justice dissented, even
though the North Carolina Supreme Court had reaffirmed its commitment to the corpus delicti doc-
trine as recently as 1983. See Brown, 308 N.C. 181, 301 S.E.2d 89.
87. Parker, 315 N.C. at 232, 337 S.E.2d at 493; see also McCoRMICK, supra note 12, at 367
(noting that "the concept of corpus delicti is not entirely clear"); Note, supra note 8, at 1206 (con-
cluding that the doctrine "is outmoded, vague, and unworkable").
88. See Parker, 315 N.C. at 232-33, 337 S.E.2d at 493. For a literal definition of "corpus
delicti" and for a description of what the doctrine requires, see supra text accompanying notes 43-
47.
89. Traditionally, the state must prove all essential elements of the crime aliunde defendant's
confession. The courts, however, have allowed for some flexibility, depending on the circumstances.
See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
90. Parker, 315 N.C. at 232, 337 S.E.2d at 493.
91. Id.; see MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 370-71.
92. See Parker, 315 N.C. at 234, 337 S.E.2d at 494 (quoting Comment, California's Corpus
Delicti Rule: The Case for Review and Clarification, 20 UCLA L. REv. 1055, 1078 (1973)). The
Parker court used this argument to rebut the claim that the corpus delicti doctrine encourages sound
law enforcement techniques. But cf. State v. Trexler, 77 N.C. App. 11, 16-18, 334 S.E.2d 414, 417-
18 (1985) (Becton, I., concurring) (arguing that the corpus delicti doctrine places the burden of proof
where it belongs--on the shoulders of the State), rev'd, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986).
93. 77 N.C. App. 11, 334 S.E.2d 414 (1985), rev'd, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986).
94. The North Carolina Court of Appeals decided Trexler on October 1, 1985; the supreme
court decided Parker on December 10, 1985. Subsequently, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals decision in Trexler and sustained defendant's conviction for driving while intoxicated. State
v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986). This decision further confuses issues that the
supreme court initially raised in Parker. See infra note 116 and accompanying text; supra note 36.
95. A witness testified that a "loud noise" awoke him and that when he peered outside he saw
defendant's automobile lying upside down on the highway. Defendant did not appear at the scene of
the accident until later that same night. When questioned by an officer whom the witness had called,
"defendant told him he had been driving the automobile at the time of the accident." Trexler, 77
N.C. App. at 12, 334 S.E.2d at 414-15. The defendant registered a blood alcohol content of .14%,
which exceeds the level that constitutes driving while impaired under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1
(1983). For additional information on the facts of Trexler, see State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342
S.E.2d 878 (1986).
96. See supra note 95. In North Carolina, prior to Parker, apparently all admissions and con-
fessions required independent corroboration by evidence of the corpus delicti. See supra notes 62-65
and accompanying text.
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that he had been driving the car when the accident occurred. 97 In the majority
opinion, Judge Webb openly criticized the position previously taken by the
North Carolina Supreme Court 98 and urged that "[c]onfessions can be good evi-
dence and should not be excluded by a rule which is not supported by reason." 99
In a concurring opinion, Judge Becton argued otherwise 1° and eloquently de-
fended the viability of the corpus delicti doctrine. 10 1 Judge Martin, on the other
hand, dissented and expressed the view that sufficient evidence supported de-
fendant's conviction.10 2
A second reason cited by the Parker court for abandoning the corpus delicti
doctrine pertained to the development of "modem" procedural safeguards: "the
conceme[s] that the defendant's confession might have been coerced or induced
by abusive police tactics ... have been undercut by the principles enunciated in
Miranda v. Arizona 10 3 ... and the development of similar doctrines relating to
the voluntariness of confessions which limit the opportunity for over-zealous law
enforcement." 104 Federal law has "constitutionalized" not only the recitation of
97. Trexler, 77 N.C. App. at 12, 334 S.E.2d at 414-15.
98. In State v. Brown, 308 N.C. 181, 301 S.E.2d 89 (1983), overruled by Parker, 315 N.C. 222,
337 S.E.2d 487, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed an arson conviction because the State
had failed to prove that someone's criminal act caused the blaze: "Even though the defendant's
confession identifies him as the person who committed the burning, the State must first establish the
corpus delicti, that a crime was in fact committed." Id. at 183, 301 S.E.2d at 90. This decision
comports with traditional requirements under the corpus delicti doctrine. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 44-46. Judge Webb in Trexler, however, complained that "Brown marked a radical depar-
ture from prior law in this state." Trexler, 77 N.C. App. at 16, 334 S.E.2d at 417. He also made "a
few additional comments in the hope that our Supreme Court will reconsider this rule and overrule
Brown." Id. at 13, 334 S.E.2d at 415.
99. Trexler, 77 N.C. App. at 16, 334 S.E.2d at 417.
100. Id. at 16-18, 334 S.E.2d at 417-18 (Becton, J., concurring).
101. Judge Becton suggested that, without the doctrine, more rather than less ambiguity would
envelop confessions in a criminal case. Id.; see supra note 75. Moreover, he stressed that the State
assumes the burden of proof in criminal cases and that the State simply failed to present adequate
evidence in the instant case. Eyewitness testimony of other circumstantial evidence could have sus-
tained a conviction. Trexler, 77 N.C. App. at 17, 334 S.E.2d at 418 (Becton, J., concurring).
102. Trexler, 77 N.C. App. at 18-19, 334 S.E.2d at 418-19 (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Martin
found supporting authority in State v. Snead, 295 N.C. 615, 247 S.E.2d 893 (1978), a DWI case
which similarly involved questions of evidentiary sufficiency. See also State v. Helms, 16 N.C App.
162, 191 S.E.2d 375 (1972) (upholding conviction for DWI based on strongly corroborating evi-
dence); Kyle v. State, 208 Tenn. 170, 344 S.W.2d 537 (1961) (upholding DWI conviction based on
circumstantial evidence that defendant had in fact been driving the car). But see State v. Hamrick,
19 Wash. App. 417, 576 P.2d 912 (1978) (reversing DWI conviction based on inadequate evidence of
the corpus delicti). Judge Martin, however, based his dissent on a faulty reading of the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court's decision in Franklin. He misinterpreted that decision to stand for the proposi-
tion that North Carolina no longer required independent evidence of the corpus delicti. See Trexler,
77 N.C. App. at 18, 334 S.E.2d at 418 (Martin, J., dissenting). For further discussion of Franklin's
significance, see supra notes 64, 80.
103. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda Court established procedural safeguards in the form of
warnings detailing a defendant's rights, which police officers must give the defendant prior to any
"custodial interrogation." See id. at 478-79.
104. Parker, 315 N.C. at 234, 337 S.E.2d at 494. The voluntariness doctrine, which tests
"whether the confession 'was made under circumstances that would reasonably lead the person
charged to believe that it would be better to confess himself guilty of a crime he had not commit-
ted,' " originated at common law but has constitutional underpinnings. H. BRANDIS, supra note 40,
at 65-66 (quoting State v. Grier, 203 N.C. 586, 166 S.E. 595 (1932)). Even today, "[tihe North
Carolina cases continue to state that 'voluntariness remains the test of admissibility of a confession,'
but, of course, this is interpreted in the light of the controlling federal cases." Id. at 67 (quoting
State v. Moore, 301 N.C. 262, 271 S.E.2d 242 (1980)).
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Miranda rights to criminal suspects undergoing interrogation, but also "the re-
quirement that criminal convictions rest on evidence proving guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."' 0 5 Moreover, North'-Carolina still recognizes the voluntariness
doctrine as an additional state law safeguard.' 0 6
Finally, the Parker court renounced the corpus delicti doctrine because it
viewed the "trustworthiness" doctrine as a better alternative to confession cor-
roboration.' 0 7 One commentator has succinctly explained and distinguished the
two doctrines as follows:
The trustworthiness version of corroboration, which emphasizes the
inherent unreliability of some confessions, requires the prosecution to
produce evidence corroborative of the confession's reliability. This evi-
dence need not directly tend to prove the corpus delicti; it is often said
that it may in fact be wholly collateral to the crime itself. The corrob-
oration, however, directly relates to the trustworthiness of the impor-
tant facts contained in the defendant's statement, whereas the corpus
delicti version is more concerned with the elements of the offense.' 0 8
In support of its decision, the Parker court stressed that the trustworthiness
doctrine "provides greater assurance against the use of an unreliable confes-
sion"'1 9 and represents a more" 'flexible rule.' "110 Moreover, virtually all fed-
eral courts'11 and several state courts 12 have adopted the new rule.
Despite the valid criticisms leveled against the corpus delicti doctrine, the
Parker court failed to recognize some of the doctrine's potential attributes. The
doctrine arguably encourages more thorough law enforcement efforts1 13 and es-
tablishes a minimum threshold evidentiary standard, thereby avoiding some am-
biguity that otherwise might arise. 114 Certainly, the trustworthiness doctrine
generates its own set of problems and confusion, "15 and a recent North Carolina
Supreme Court decision reflects a fundamental misapprehension of its
import. 116
105. McCORMICK, supra note 12, at 370-71.
106. See supra note 104.
107. See Parker, 315 N.C. at 234-36, 337 S.E.2d at 494-95.
108. Note, supra note 8, at 1217.
109. Parker, 315 N.C. at 234, 337 S.E.2d at 494.
110. Id. (quoting State v. Yoshida, 44 Hawaii 352, 357-58, 354 P.2d 986, 990 (1960)). Consider
the observation of one student commentator: "In many cases, in fact, trustworthiness corroboration
and corpus delicti corroboration lead to identical results. The former's advantage lies in its simplicity
and its direct bearing on the reliability of facts stated in the confession or admission." Note, supra
note 8, at 1219.
111. See supra notes 54, 56 and accompanying text.
112. See WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2071, at 511 n.3. Nevertheless, the "vast majority" of
states still recognize the corpus delicti doctrine. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 366.
113. See supra note 76.
114. See supra notes 72-76, 101-02 and accompanying text.
115. Although the trustworthiness doctrine adopted by the Parker court provides flexibility,
problems may arise when the courts attempt to define trustworthiness. In the aftermath of Parker,
North Carolina trial courts may experience substantial difficulties in this regard. See infra notes 131-
40 and accompanying text.
116. See Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878. The supreme court reversed the court of ap-
peals and sustained defendants conviction for driving while intoxicated. Id. at 535, 342 S.E.2d at
882. Chief Justice Branch's opinion in Trexler apparently confused the requirements of the corpus
delicti doctrine with those of the trustworthiness doctrine; although Trexler would suggest that the
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In addition, modem procedural safeguards have not eliminated all the con-
cers traditionally addressed by the corpus delicti doctrine. The Miranda deci-
sion1 17 and North Carolina's voluntariness doctrine118 simply do not guard
against the possibility of false or misleading confessions or admissions. In the-
ory and in practice the corpus delicti doctrine establishes an additional eviden-
tiary test for sustaining a defendant's conviction. 19 Further, the need for a
demanding corroboration requirement has assumed great importance today, as
commentators begin to question the effectiveness of the procedural constitu-
tional safeguards. 120
Moreover, conceding the possible merits of the trustworthiness doctrine,
the Parker decision raises several issues that demand careful consideration.
First, how should the courts interpret the scope of the decision? The Parker
court clearly stated that its rulings apply only to "non-capital cases." 121 This
statement apparently signifies that the former corpus delicti doctrine still applies
to first-degree homicide cases, 122 while apparently it leaves undisturbed the
court's holding in State v. Franklin.123 The potential for convictions based on
erroneous confessions or admissions, however, does not diminish when the State
prosecutes a defendant for a noncapital rather than a capital offense. 124 Justice
Billings alluded to no other jurisdiction that makes this distinction. 125 Appar-
ently, the Parker court mistrusted its own logic and preferred to preserve the
corpus delicti doctrine has survived Parker, see id. at 532-34, 342 S.E.2d at 880-82, this Note reasons
otherwise. See supra note 36.
117. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See supra notes 39, 103 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Miranda's relevance to the corpus delicti doctrine.
118. See supra notes 4, 58 & 104 and accompanying text for a discussion of the voluntariness
doctrine and its relevance to the corpus delicti doctrine.
119. According to one student commentator,
Voluntariness is the one basic standard which is applied to all statements, in order to deter-
mine their admissibility. Requiring independent proof of the corpus delicti is another.
Holding that the concept of voluntariness is constitutionally required has little or no bear-
ing on establishing that the corpus delicti rule, which merely embodies an additional test
for admission of the confessions, is required as well.
Comment, California's Corpus Delicti Rule: The Case for Review and Clarification, 20 UCLA L.
RPv. 1055, 1085 (1973).
120. Miranda did not address some issues that continue to chip away at the accused's procedural
protections. See, eg., Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revisited, 18 AKRON L. REv. 177, 182
(1984) (concluding that "the present [United States Supreme] Court has consigned Escobedo to the
ash heap of legal history and Miranda is twisting slowly in the wind"); Note, supra note 8, at 1209
n.28 (conceding that Miranda raises some difficulties today and that commentators still debate its
effectiveness). At the same time, one student commentator has suggested that a recent North Caro-
lina Supreme Court decision, State v. Thomas, 310 N.C. 369, 312 S.E.2d 458 (1984), "might have
hastened a course of uncertainty in the application of North Carolina's voluntariness standards ....
[The result] might mean future abuse as both courts and law enforcement officials attempt to func-
tion with diminishing or minimal guidelines." Note, supra note 4, at 1227.
121. Parker, 315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495.
122. See supra note 65.
123. 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983). Parker overruled "language" in Franklin without
disturbing its basic holding or premise. Parker, 315 N.C. at 239, 337 S.E.2d at 497. For a discussion
of Franklin, see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
124. See Developments, supra note 62, at 1081; see also Trexler, 77 N.C. App. at 16-18, 334
S.E.2d at 417-18 (Becton, L, concurring) (arguing that a confession, absent some corroborating evi-
dence of the corpus delicti, should not sustain a conviction for drunk driving).
125. A review of case law uncovers no jurisdiction that applies the trustworthiness doctrine to
noncapital cases exclusively. Rather, those jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine apparently
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traditional version of the corpus delicti doctrine in homicide cases. 126
Second and more important, the Parker court did not conclusively resolve
how trial courts should determine "trustworthiness." The decision seemingly
posits a rigorous standard: "when independent proof of loss or injury is lacking,
there must be strong corroboration of essential facts and circumstances em-
braced in the defendant's confession. Corroboration of insignificant facts or
those unrelated to the commission of the crime will not suffice." 127 To demon-
strate how a court should determine trustworthiness, the court carefully ana-
lyzed the facts in Parker. Defendant had committed multiple offenses, 128 and
details in his confession closely paralleled the evidence presented at trial. 129
Further, defendant had ample motive and opportunity to commit the additional
robbery charged. 130
In principle the Parker doctrine is sound, but the decision provides lower
courts with little guidance on how to apply the doctrine in other cases. Courts
in other jurisdictions have encountered some problems in assessing trustworthi-
ness, 131 and now the North Carolina courts may experience similar difficul-
ties. 132 Justice Billings stressed that "under the particular facts presented in this
case .... there was sufficient corroborative evidence to bolster the truthfulness of
use it in every case. See, e.g., State v. Zarinsky, 143 N.J. Super. 35, 362 A.2d 611 (App. Div. 1976)
(trustworthiness doctrine applied in first degree homicide case).
126. See supra note 65. In the great majority of jurisdictions, a homicide conviction may depend
entirely on circumstantial evidence, without the finding of a body or eyewitness testimony of the
homicidal act. See WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 2081, at 450 n.8. Apparently, in the aftermath of
Parker, the State still must prove its case with independent evidence of the elements of a capital
offense. At least one appellate court has argued strenuously that the corpus delicti doctrine should
not apply to exonerate a defendant who has confessed to the murder of his victim. See State v.
Ralston, 67 Ohio App. 2d 81, 425 N.E.2d 916 (1979).
127. Parker, 315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495.
128. The State had prosecuted Parker for the murders and robberies of Leslie Levon Thorbs and
Ray Anthony Herring. See supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
129. In the Parker opinion Justice Billings carefully described how the evidence matched details
in defendant's confession. Parker, 315 N.C. at 238, 337 S.E.2d at 496. The Parker court particularly
stressed that "defendant was charged with multiple offenses; the corpus delicti as to the more serious
offenses was established independently of the defendant's confession; an element of the crime, use of
a deadly weapon, was also established by independent evidence; and the State's evidence closely
paralleled the defendant's statements." Id.
130. For a description of the facts of the case, see supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
131. New Jersey and New Mexico have adopted the trustworthiness doctrine. In State ex rel.
J.P.B., 143 N.J. Super. 96, 362 A.2d 1183 (App. Div. 1976), the trial court had adjudged defendant
delinquent upon a finding that he had robbed and murdered his victim. The appellate court over-
turned defendant's conviction because his statements "contain[ed] no specific details which.., could
have been corroborated by the known facts" and because defendant's statements "contain[ed] many
discrepancies." Id. at 112-13, 362 A.2d at 1192 (emphasis added). In a dissenting opinion, however,
Judge Carton found "more than sufficient corroborating evidence tending to establish that the de-
fendant was telling the truth." Id. at 119, 362 A.2d at 1195 (Carton, P.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Similarly, in Doe v. State, 94 N.M. 548, 613 P.2d 418 (1980), the majority and
dissenting opinions disagreed vehemently over the issue of trustworthiness. Compare id. at 549, 613
P.2d at 419 (overturning defendant's conviction for shoplifting because "the corroborating evidence
is not sufficient to establish the reliability of the confession in light of the circumstances in this
case"), with id. at 549-50, 613 P.2d at 419-20 (Easley, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]t is abundantly
clear that Doe's confession.., was corroborated by other substantial circumstantial evidence").
132. The North Carolina Supreme Court recently decided a case that will generate additional
confusion among the lower courts. In State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986), the
supreme court seemingly confused the corpus delicti doctrine with the trustworthiness doctrine and
attempted to revive the former doctrine. The two doctrines involve different approaches to confes-
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the defendant's confession and to sustain a conviction." 133 She did not indicate
whether a defendant's confession or admission134 would survive judicial scrutiny
if the defendant had committed a single offense, if the defendant were harrassed
or bewildered when he or she admitted guilt, if the defendant were physically or
emotionally unstable, or if the independent evidence were available but the State
simply failed to present it.1 35 It is unclear whether prior decisions decided
under the corpus delicti doctrine would have resulted in different rulings under
the trustworthiness doctrine. 136 The outcome would have depended on the spe-
cific court's view of trustworthiness.
A strict interpretation of Parker would ensure that trial courts do not rou-
tinely and automatically sustain convictions that are based on the accused's in-
criminatory statements. Trial judges must recognize that a full-blown
confession presents more opportunities for corroboration than do mere admis-
sions;137 thus, confessions should carry greater weight when determining trust-
worthiness. Every time the State relies on a defendant's confession or admission
to sustain a conviction, and the State offers no independent evidence of a key
element of the offense charged, the court should carefully weigh the following
factors:' 38 (1) the emotional, physical, and psychological state of the defendant
sion corroboration, yet the Trexler decision did not purport to overrule Parker. See Id. at 532-34,
342 S.E.2d at 880-82. For further discussion of Trexler, see note 36.
133. Parker, 315 N.C. at 238, 337 S.E.2d at 496 (emphasis added).
134. For definitions and a distinction between admissions and confessions, see supra note 63.
135. In State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986), the North Carolina Supreme
Court implied that the State must use independent evidence of the corpus delicti of a crime when that
evidence exists. See id. at 880-82.
136. For example, in Trexler, 77 N.C. App. 11, 334 S.E.2d 414 (1985), rev'd, 316 N.C. 528, 342
S.E.2d 414 (1986), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the corpus delieti doctrine re-
quired a reversal of defendant's conviction for driving while intoxicated. In this pre-Parker decision,
Judge Becton's concurring opinion indicated that he would not have upheld defendant's conviction
for DWI even under the new Parker rule. Id. at 16-18, 334 S.E.2d at 417-18. (Becton, J., concur-
ring). Judge Webb's opinion, however, definitely indicated that he would have sustained defendant's
conviction under the new rule: "confessions can be good evidence and should not be excluded by a
rule which is not supported by reason." Id. at 17, 334 S.E.2d at 417. For further discussion or
Trexler, see supra notes 36, 93-102.
137. See supra note 63. Defendant in Parker essentially made an incriminatory admission when
he said "I got ... $10.00 from the other guy." See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Yet this
admission appeared in the context of an eight-page confession. See supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
138. A review of state and federal cases reveals no explicit listing of those factors that would
contribute to the trustworthiness of a confession or admission. Nevertheless, some factors may be
gleaned from the context of decisions. For example, courts may look to whether the defendant's
statements were convincing. See, eg., United States v. Basile, 771 F.2d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1985)
(upholding defendant's conviction for mail fraud because he "told what he was going to do... and
afterwards he said he had done it that way. He is very convincing."). Courts also may consider the
defendant's familiarity with co-conspirators in a conspiracy case, as well as some evidence of an
overt act, whether criminal or not. See, eg., United States v. Todd, 657 F.2d 212, 216-17 (8th Cir.
1981) (finding insufficient corroborative evidence to support a conviction for conspiracy to rob or to
commit first degree murder, but sufficient evidence to convict defendant for conspiracy to commit
second degree murder). Courts may look at the source of the admission or confession. Compare
United States v. Fearn, 589 F.2d 1316, 1322-24 (7th Cir. 1978) (overturning defendant's conviction
for fraud apparently because the court discounted the testimony of defendant's landlord who had
reported defendant's alleged admission of guilt) with Basile, 771 F.2d at 311 (upholding a conviction
based on defendant's surreptitiously recorded statements because "[defendant] is very convincing on
the tapes"). The accuracy of the defendant's description of the victim and the scene of the crime
may also be important factors. See, eg., State ex rel. J.P.B., 143 N.J. Super. 96, 362 A.2d 1183
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at the time of the confession or admission; (2) the amount of detail in the defend-
ant's statements; (3) the availability of evidence that directly corroborates key
elements of each offense charged; (4) whether the defendant has committed a
single offense or multiple offenses; and (5) as suggested by the Parker court,
whether defendant had a realistic opportunity to commit the crime. 139 The de-
termination of trustworthiness will always involve some subjectivity, and courts
should resolve any doubts in favor of the defendant. 14
In Parker the North Carolina Supreme Court abandoned the requirement
that evidence independent of the defendant's confession prove the corpus delicti
of a noncapital offense. Justice Billings spoke for a unanimous court when she
criticized the corpus delicti doctrine as confusing, outmoded, duplicative, and
ineffective. To ensure that the State never convicts an innocent defendant, the
Parker court adopted the doctrine recognized by almost all federal courts and
several state courts-the trustworthiness doctrine. The two doctrines approach
confession corroboration from different vantage points: the corpus delicti doc-
trine focuses on independent evidence of key elements of the offense charged,
while the trustworthiness doctrine demands only that the State present evidence
corroborating a defendant's confession. In effect the two doctrines often may
reach the same result. However, the Parker court failed to address several issues
that require further consideration, including the scope of the decision and the
factors that contribute to a confession's trustworthiness. The corpus delicti doc-
trine was subject to misinterpretaion by the courts, but it at least posed an evi-
dentiary threshold that afforded some protection for criminal defendants.
Unless trial courts thoroughly analyze all factors relevant to a finding of trust-
worthiness, the new doctrine may lead to greater inconsistencies and may jeop-
ardize suspects' rights.
BRIAN C. REEVE
(App. Div. 1976) (commenting on ambiguities implicit in defendant J.P.B.'s confession). Finally,
courts may check for internal consistencies evident in the defendant's confession or admission. See,
e.g., id. (commenting on inconsistencies apparent in defendant's confessions).
139. Parker, 315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495 (stating the "rule" that defendant's confession
may support a conviction if the State presents "facts that tend to show the defendant had the oppor-
tunity to commit the crime," inter alia). The Parker decision at least implicitly would require in-
dependent evidence of the last four factors. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. For a
description of other factors that courts should consider, see supra note 138.
140. Ultimately, of course, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
has committed a crime, and the United States Supreme Court has "constitutionalized" this standard.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 371 n.37 (discussing
Jackson). Nevertheless, in its application, the trustworthiness doctrine necessarily would require
that defendant come forward with some evidence of untrustworthiness, namely, that defendant's
confession or admission is unreliable and hence should not support a conviction without independent
evidence of the corpus delicti. For one view of how the burden of proof should operate in a trustwor-
thiness jurisdiction, see Note, supra note 8, at 1236-40. The author notes that
[t]he defendant must first make a reasonable showing that the contested facts are untrue.
Upon this showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor, who may establish the facts as
reliable by offering circumstantial or direct evidence of the facts at issue, or by attacking
the credibility of the defendant's claim.
Id. at 1238.
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